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ABSTRACT 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) play a key role in promoting the production of environmental 
public goods by European Union agriculture. Although extensive literature has analyzed AES, some 
important issues remain understudied. This paper performs an ex-ante assessment of AES in 
permanent cropping, analyzing several issues that have received little attention from researchers, such 
as ecological focus areas (EFA) and collective participation. For this purpose, a choice experiment was 
used to assess farmers’ preferences toward AES in a case study of olive groves in southern Spain. 
Results show high heterogeneity among farmers, with different classes being identified, from potential 
participants to non-participants. As regards EFA, almost half of the farmers would be willing to accept 
it for low monetary incentives (€8-9/ha per additional 1% of the farmland devoted to EFA) while the 
rest would do it for moderate-to-high monetary incentives (€41-151/ha per additional 1% of EFA). 
However, for a high share of EFA (e.g., 5-7%) higher incentives would presumably be required due to 
the intrinsic spatial restrictions of olive groves. With regard to collective participation, we find that it 
is unlikely that farmers would participate collectively with the incentive of the up-to-30% EU-wide 
bonus. These results are relevant for policy-making now when new AES are being designed for the 
next programming period 2014-2020. 
 
KEYWORDS: Environmental public goods; Agri-environmental Schemes; Olive groves; Collective 
participation; Ecological focus areas; Choice experiment. 
 
1. Introduction 
The provision of public goods by agriculture is a relevant objective shared by most of the agricultural 
policies of developed countries (OECD, 2008). This objective has gained relevance throughout time 
because of society’s increasing demands for such goods. However, the design of efficient tools 
oriented to achieve this objective represents a daunting challenge for policy-making. In particular, 
policy-makers have to take account of the type of joint production (of private and public goods) and 
farmers’ preferences and circumstances to design tools that effectively promote agricultural public 
goods production without distorting commodity markets (OECD, 2001; Cooper et al., 2009). Yet, 
analyses are still required to support public decision-making regarding the design of such tools (Hart 
et al., 2011; OECD, 2013). 
Among tools to promote the provision of public goods by agriculture, voluntary incentive-
based payments aimed at compensating the farmer for the rent forgone derived from the use of related 
non-productive agricultural practices are a suitable option (OECD, 2001; Hart et al., 2011; Hodge, 
2013). These are no (or little) distorting tools (i.e., part of the Green Box of World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Agriculture) specifically targeted to the production of agricultural public goods. A 
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paradigmatic case of this type of tools are the agri-environmental schemes (AES) of the European 
Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). AES are multiannual and voluntary incentive-
based payments to farmers for preserving and enhancing environmental public goods. They usually 
consist of a per-hectare payment implemented regionally and co-financed by the EU and each of its 
Member States (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). AES stand out as one of the 
most significant CAP tools as they have assigned an aggregated expenditure of 22.2 billion euro (that 
is, 22% of the budget of the European Rural Development Policy 2007-2013, according to ECA, 
2011). Thus, the implementation of AES is a good proof of how the objective of encouraging public 
goods provision has become a key concept for the design of the CAP (EC, 2010a). 
Not surprisingly, AES have been the subject of much attention by researchers (Uthes and 
Matzdorf, 2013). Their work has focused mainly on the barriers to participation in such schemes 
(Falconer, 2000; Christensen et al., 2011; Broch and Vedel, 2012), and on improving their design 
(Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010). However, more in-depth knowledge is still 
needed regarding some important issues such as farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) for AES 
participation in agricultural systems made up of permanent crops, the inclusion of ecological focus 
areas (EFA) and collective participation in such schemes. 
With regard to the first issue, it is worth pointing out that ex-ante analyses of farmers’ WTA 
for AES enrollment in permanent cropping systems are lacking in the literature. While AES in these 
agricultural systems have been previously studied (Calatrava-Leyva et al., 2007; Duarte et al., 2008; 
Fleskens and de Graaff, 2010; Franco, 2011), to the authors’ knowledge none of these works have 
focused on the ex-ante assessments of farmers’ WTA for AES participation, though this is not the case 
for herbaceous cropping systems (Christensen et al., 2011; Broch and Vedel, 2012). Ex-ante analyses 
of farmers’ WTA for AES participation in permanent crops are opportune now since new AES are 
being designed for the next programming period, 2014-2020. This is particularly true for the case of 
olive groves in southern Spain, considering not only their high socioeconomic relevance, but also the 
numerous environmental problems that have emerged as a consequence of the expansion and 
intensification process that olive growing has undergone over the last two decades (Gómez-Limón and 
Arriaza, 2011). Specifically, these negative environmental impacts are soil erosion, biodiversity loss, 
overexploitation of water resources, non-point water pollution and deterioration of traditional 
landscapes (Beaufoy and Pienkowski, 2000; Gómez, 2009). Recent studies highlight that there is great 
scope for improvement in the production of environmental public goods by olive growing (Carmona-
Torres et al., 2014; Villanueva et al., 2014). These studies identify soil conservation practices as one 
of the most important environmental-friendly practices to be adopted by olive growers, especially the 
use of cover crops (CC). CC are spontaneous or cultivated plants that grow between tree lines with the 
main objective of soil protection (Gómez, 2009). Apart from soil conservation, the use of CC has 
additional positive environmental impacts on soil carbon sequestration (González-Sánchez et al., 
2012), biodiversity (Rey, 2011), visual quality of landscapes (Arriaza et al., 2004) and water pollution 
(Castro et al., 2008). Although there are studies that analyze the adoption of CC (Franco, 2011; 
Rodríguez-Entrena and Arriaza, 2013), to our best knowledge there are no other studies estimating 
farmers’ WTA for CC within AES. 
Apart from the agricultural system, the second issue that has received limited attention in the 
literature about AES is the promotion of EFA in farmland. EFA is defined in CAP regulations as areas 
with landscape features, terraces, buffer strips, land lying fallow, afforested areas and agro-forestry 
areas, or areas with a reduced use of inputs on the farm, such as those covered by catch crops and 
winter green cover. The presence of EFA generally improves biodiversity, as well as other public 
goods such as visual quality of landscapes, soil conservation, and so on (Stoate et al., 2009; EC, 
2011a). This is the main reason that led to the European Commission (EC, 2011b) proposing a new 
instrument in the CAP 2014-2020, known as green payment, for those farms fulfilling some basic 
environmental requirements, including dedicating 7% of their farmland to EFA. However, this 
particular requirement was later relaxed as a result of the political debate and in the final regulation 
(Regulation 1307/2013, Art. 43-47) the share of EFA was set at 5%, compulsory for arable land only 
(permanent crops are eligible for this payment without any minimum EFA requisite). Therefore, this 
research aims at exploring in advance the olive growers’ behavior regarding the implementation of 
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EFA in their farmland. This is carried out by means of considering the inclusion of EFA in AES as a 
possible transitional period on the way to a hypothetical future implementation of EFA as a requisite 
for being eligible for the green payment in permanent crops. 
The third issue to receive scarce attention in the literature is collective participation in AES, 
understood as farmers collectively signing AES contracts. It represents a promising way of reducing 
public transaction costs (costs of the resources spent by the Administration in providing information 
about the AES, subscribing contracts, monitoring implementation and making payments) while 
increasing the environmental effectiveness of policy tools. Specifically, spreading out the collective 
participation in AES reduces the number of applications to be processed as well as the costs of 
monitoring, consequently reducing transaction costs incurred by the government (Franks, 2011; Emery 
and Franks, 2012). Moreover, if the collective participation in AES is implemented in such a way that 
ensures the proximity of the farms that form the collective, a greater environmental effect would also 
be expected (Sutherland et al., 2012). Focusing on olive growing agricultural systems, it is worth 
quoting a recent work carried out by Rocamora-Montiel et al. (2014) who have explored the potential 
of territorial contracts in mountainous olive production systems in southern Spain as a tool to increase 
the farmers’ profitability by adopting organic farming. This work represents a precedent of the current 
research since it reflects the interest for collective contracts in permanent cropping systems, in 
particular in olive growing. Despite the relevance of this topic, to the authors’ knowledge, there is no 
paper that quantitatively analyzes farmers’ willingness to participate in AES collectively, neither in 
olive growing nor in any other agricultural system. 
In this paper, we use the choice experiment method to analyze southern Spain’s olive growers’ 
preferences toward AES including the above-mentioned innovative issues. The main objectives of this 
analysis are to support the design of new AES aimed at promoting public goods production by olive 
growing, and to partially bridge the existing knowledge gaps about the inclusion of CC, EFA and 
collective participation in AES contracts. Therefore, the results of this analysis may be very useful for 
policy-making, particularly now when new AES are being designed for the next programming period, 
2014-2020. For this purpose, the paper is structured as follows. The next section is devoted to the 
description of the method and the data gathering used for the empirical analysis. The main results are 
presented in the third section and discussed in the fourth, where the main policy implications are also 
outlined. Finally, in the fifth section some conclusions are highlighted. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Choice experiment approach 
Choice experiment (CE) is a stated preference valuation technique based on Lancasterian Consumer 
Theory of utility maximization which postulates that consumption decisions are determined by the 
utility or value derived from the attributes of the good being consumed (Lancaster, 1966). The 
econometric basis of the approach lies in the Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 1974)1. CE is well 
suited to measuring the marginal value of the attributes of a good or a policy instrument (Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009), with the underlying assumption being that farmers’ choices among voluntary policy 
schemes depend on the specific characteristics -attributes- of these schemes (Christensen et al., 2011). 
In fact, the use of this approach to support policy-making has sharply increased in the last five years, 
especially in regard to AES design. Noteworthy studies that use CE to analyze AES include Ruto and 
Garrod (2009), who study EU farmers’ preferences toward design attributes of AES; Espinosa-Goded 
et al. (2010), who analyze the adoption of AES in specific extensive herbaceous agri-systems in Spain; 
Christensen et al. (2011), who study Danish farmers’ willingness to participate in pesticide reduction 
AES; and Broch and Vedel (2012), who analyze Danish farmers’ willingness to participate in 
afforestation AES. Also, it is worth remarking on the work of Schulz et al. (2014), which analyzes 
German farmers’ willingness to accept green payments. All these examples support the choice of CE 
as the approach taken for this empirical study. 
                                                 
1
 For an extensive explanation of the choice experiment theory and practice, see Hensher et al. (2005). 
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2.2. Case study, attributes and levels 
The case study selected for the analysis is olive growing in Andalusia (southern Spain), given that this 
is the main crop grown in this region (over 1.5 million hectares, 48% of Andalusian farmland) and has 
great potential for improvement in the production of environmental public goods. According to 
Villanueva et al. (2014), soil fertility, visual quality of the landscape, biodiversity and mitigation of 
climate change are the four public goods presenting the highest enhancement potential from a supply 
point of view. Moreover, all of these public goods are in high demand by European (EC, 2010b) and 
Andalusian (Salazar-Ordóñez et al., 2013; Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2014b) societies. Thus, it is 
reasonable that any AES for olive growing in Andalusia should focus on agronomic practices aimed at 
increasing the provision of these public goods. For this reason, three of the attributes considered for 
the implementation of the CE are linked with agricultural management; two of them related to the use 
of CC and one to EFA. 
Regarding CC, Villanueva et al. (2014) find that it possibly represents the most useful 
agricultural practice in olive growing in terms of enhancing the production of environmental public 
goods. In any case, the level of production of these public goods derived from the use of CC in this 
agricultural system depends on the area covered and how farmers manage these CC (Barranco et al., 
2008). Accordingly, the area covered by CC and their management are the two related attributes 
included in the CE. For the attribute Cover crops area (CCAR), two levels were set: 25% and 50% of 
the olive grove area (CCAR-25% and CCAR-50%, respectively) (see Table 1). In both cases CC are 
supposed to be maintained (at least) from October to mid-March every year. As regards the attribute 
Cover crops management (CCMA), two levels were also set: free (CCMA-Free) and restrictive 
management (CCMA-Restr). The latter corresponds to the management established in the current AES 
specifically devoted to olive growing (Sub-measure 7 or SM72), that basically restricts the use of both 
tillage and herbicide in CC management, while the former implies no further restrictions than those 
that are part of cross-compliance. 
For the attribute Ecological focus areas (EFA), levels were set at 0 and 2% of the olive grove 
plots covered by EFA (EFA-0% and EFA-2%, respectively). The first level is equivalent to the 
requirement included in green payment for permanent crops. The second is substantially below the 5% 
of EFA finally established for arable lands in the new CAP and was decided upon after taking into 
account both the current lack of these kinds of areas in Andalusian olive groves and the difficulties of 
increasing the share of EFA in permanent crops (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011). In any case, it can 
be assumed that the proposed 2% of EFA could effectively entail environmental improvement by 
creating new buffer strips, vegetation boundaries and islets or maintaining some olive trees out of 
production (the latter being equivalent to land lying fallow). 
Table 1. Attributes and levels used in the choice set designµ. 
Attribute [Acronym] Explanation Levels 
Cover crops area [CCAR] Percentage of the olive grove area covered by 
cover crops 25 and 50% 
Cover crops management 
[CCMA] Farmer’s management of the cover crops Free and restrictive management 
Ecological focus areas 
[EFA] 
Percentage of the olive grove plots covered 
by ecological focus areas 0 and 2% 
Collective participation 
[COLLE] 
Participation of a group of farmers (at least 5) 
with farms located in the same municipality 
Individual and collective 
participation 
Monitoring [MONI] Percentage of farms monitored each year 5 and 20% 
                                                 
2
 SM7 was an AES implemented for olive growing in the Andalusian Rural Development Program 2007-2013, targeted at 
integrated farming in olive groves located in Natura 2000 areas or watersheds of reservoirs for urban water supply. 
Participation in this scheme involved the use of CC from November (when the rainy season begins) to mid-March (when the 
CC start to compete with olive trees for soil water). SM7 payments were linked to the strip width of the CC, €204/ha and 
€286/ha per year for strips 1.8 and 3.6m wide, respectively. As regards its management, soil tillage was not allowed (except 
for sowing cultivated CC) and the use of herbicides was restricted to twice every five years (but never twice in a single year). 
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Attribute [Acronym] Explanation Levels 
Payment [PAYM] Yearly payment per ha for a 5-year AES 
contract 
€100, 200, 300 and 400/ha per 
year 
µ
 The status quo level considered is the farmer’s initial condition for CCAR, CCMA, and EFA, COLLE=Individual, 
MONI=5%, and zero PAYM. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
In addition to the above-mentioned agronomic attributes, the CE implemented also includes 
two policy design attributes: collective participation and level of monitoring. For Collective 
participation (COLLE), the two established levels are straightforward, that is, collective and 
individual participation. However, a precise definition of the collective participation was needed; for 
participation to be considered collective, a group of at least five farmers whose farms were located in 
the same municipality had to sign the same AES contract. The five-farmer threshold was chosen in 
order to be large enough to require an effort from the farmers to create the group, and small enough to 
avoid farmers’ negative perceptions of large groups. It was explained to farmers that they could freely 
create the group with those whom they trust the most. Also, it was specified that if a farmer of the 
collective was monitored and found not to comply with the scheme requirements, in addition to 
regular sanctions being imposed on that farmer (calculated, as per usual, according to the nature and 
gravity of the infringement), the other farmers in the collective would be monitored to ensure their 
compliance with requirements. Regarding the attribute Monitoring (MONI), two levels were also set: 
5 and 20% (MONI-5% and MONI-20%, respectively). The lower level was set equal to the normal 
monitoring level of the CAP measures, while the higher was set to make the difference with respect to 
the lower level more visible to the farmers (in the pre-test, a 10% of monitoring level was used as the 
higher level but it was observed that it did not make the difference -in farmers’ eyes- with respect to 
the 5%-level). 
The last attribute, payment (PAYM), is normally included in this type of analysis to derive 
willingness to accept (WTA) associated with each attribute considered. The four levels were set 
according to payments in SM7 (€204-286/ha per year). Two levels (€200/ha and €300/ha) were set in 
line with these payments, while two further levels (€100/ha and €400/ha) were set as minimum and 
maximum payments. 
Lastly, it is worth commenting on other policy design attributes not considered explicitly in 
the CE. In this sense, the contract length of the AES was set at five years, with no exit-option 
available, and the minimum area for participation was set at the area of the largest plot. The first two 
attributes are typical of AES in Spain, while the last was set to facilitate the answers of the farmers. 
2.3. Experimental design and data collection 
Considering the number of attributes and levels, a large number of AES profiles (128) can be 
constructed, resulting in 1924 combinations for a two-option choice set design. To create a more 
manageable number of options, the methodological approach of fractional factorial design and optimal 
orthogonal in the differences proposed by Street and Burgess (2007) was used, resulting in 192 
profiles and a D-efficiency of 91.3%. To make the number of choice tasks manageable for 
respondents, the 192 choice sets were divided into 24 blocks of 8 choice sets each, with one farmer 
answering one block. In each choice set, farmers were asked to choose between two alternatives, in 
addition to a possible no-choice (Status Quo or SQ) option under which the farmer chooses to continue 
with his current practice. Appendix A shows an example of a choice set. 
A specific questionnaire was designed and tested to implement an ad hoc survey, which 
included five sets of questions: 1) Structural characteristics of the farm (farm size, type of tenancy, 
rain-fed or irrigated land, slope, age of the grove, olive tree density, subsidies perceived, etc.), 2) 
Characteristics of the olive grower (gender, age, off-farm economic activities, level of education, 
agricultural professional training, working time, etc.), 3) Technology of production, information 
gathering about agricultural practices (soil management, pest management, pruning, irrigation and 
harvesting), farm employment, and yield obtained, 4) Choice sets as shown in Appendix A, and 5) 
Knowledge, attitudes and perceptions toward the implementation of AES in olive growing. 
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A multi-stage sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage, five agricultural districts3 in 
Andalusia were selected as primary sampling units from a total of 52 following a stratified sampling 
proportional to olive grove area. The sampled districts cover 453,682 ha and account for 31.0% of 
Andalusian olive groves. In the next stage, 10 villages located in each of the sampled districts were 
selected as secondary sampling units using a random route procedure. Finally, in each village 6-8 
personal interviews were conducted using convenience sampling4 to select participant olive growers. 
Finally, 330 properly filled-in questionnaires were obtained. Among them, 35 were considered to be 
protests5, reducing the total number of valid interviews to 295 (104 of which related to irrigated farms, 
which is roughly on par with the share of irrigated farms in Andalusian olive growing according to 
INE, 2014). The interviews were carried out from October 2013 to January 2014. A cheap talk was 
used to ensure that farmers understood correctly before answering the questionnaire. 
2.4. Model specification: latent class model 
To incorporate preference heterogeneity into choice modelling, the Latent Class Model approach 
(LCM) was used. LCM is a mixed logit model with a discrete distribution of parameters, well suited to 
the task of considering respondents’ preference heterogeneity and revealing its causes (Greene and 
Hensher, 2003). This approach reveals a considerable richness in the structure of preferences, 
supporting the hypothesis that there are latent classes, which would otherwise be unobservable (Scarpa 
and Thiene, 2005). Unlike continuous mixed models (such as Random Parameter Logit Models, RPL), 
LCM allows the grouping of individuals according to their preferences which is very useful when 
heterogeneous preferences are analyzed (Hess et al., 2011), especially for extracting policy 
implications (Hynes et al., 2008). Actually, several studies have recently used LCM to analyze the 
heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences toward agri-environmental policy (Ruto and Garrod, 2009; 
Schulz et al., 2014, among others). These studies prove the usefulness of the latent classes approach in 
analyzing such heterogeneity. 
As mentioned, latent heterogeneity is analyzed through a model of discrete parameter 
variation, where it is assumed that individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of s classes. However, the 
specific class of each individual is unknown to the analyst. Therefore, the LCM approach is based on a 
class membership probability equation, which has a classical logit formulation (assuming that the error 
components are identically and independently distributed following a Gumbel distribution). Thus, 
preference heterogeneity is captured by simultaneously assigning individuals to behavioral groups or 
latent classes while estimating a choice model. Formally, in the LCM, the utility (U) of alternative j ∈ 
J to individual n (in a choice situation t) who belongs to a particular class s, can be written as: 
| = 	 +         [1] 
where Xjnt is a vector of attributes associated with alternative j and individual n, βs is a class specific 
parameter vector associated with the vector of explanatory choice attributes Xjn and εjn is the 
unobserved heterogeneity (the scale parameter is normalized to 1 and omitted). Within the class, 
choice probabilities are assumed to be generated by the multinomial logit model. The probability (P) 
of an individual n, who makes a sequence of choices (y1, y2,… yT) among a particular set of 
alternatives J, to belong to class s is given by the following common formulation (Colombo et al., 
2009): 
                                                 
3
 Campiña Norte and La Loma (province of Jaen), La Sierra and Campiña Alta (province of Cordoba), and Norte (province of 
Malaga). 
4
 The sampling process consisted of looking for olive growers to be interviewed in each village (e.g., in agricultural 
cooperatives and private olive mills, agricultural public offices, gas stations, fertilizer shops or even at the street). 
5
 Those who chose the SQ-option in all the choice sets without considering the alternative AES proposed in each (i.e., did not 
make trade-offs among alternatives but directly chose the SQ-option) were considered protests. The most commonly cited 
reason for always choosing the SQ-option was lack of trust in public institutions. This definition of protesters has also been 
used in previous works (e.g. Christensen et al., 2011). 
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where the first expression in brackets is the probability of observing the individual in class s according 
to a set of individual-specific characteristics (the Zn variables and their parameters αs), with the 
remaining coefficients explained above. In our empirical approach class membership have been 
estimated based on farmers’ preferences only. An overview of the specification of the LCM can be 
found in Hess et al. (2011). 
In the LCM used here, the attributes CCMA and COLLE are treated as dummy coded 
variables (non-linear effects), CCAR, EFA and MONI as end-point linear variables and PAYM as 
linear variable. 
To choose the optimal number of classes, log-likelihood (LL), minimum Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), and minimum Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics were used. Table 2 
shows the values of these statistics for one-class to five-classes solutions. As is shown in this table, 
LL, AIC and BIC statistics experienced a marked improvement (i.e., higher LL, and lower AIC and 
BIC) in each step of estimation from the one-class solution (LL=-2.107; AIC=1.791; BIC=1.808) to 
four-class solution (LL=-1569; AIC=1.356; BIC=1.432), simultaneously resulting in a marked 
increase in the McFadden’s pseudo-R2. For a higher number of classes, there were worse model 
parsimony and no clear improvement in all the statistics (the five-class solution had negligible 
improvements for LL, Pseudo-R2 and AIC, but higher BIC, with respect to the four-class solution). 
Therefore, we opted for a four-class solution. 
Table 2. Criteria used for setting the optimal class number*. 
Nº of segments/ 
classes 
Nº of 
parameters (P) LL 
McFadden`s 
Pseudo-R2 AIC BIC 
1 7 
-2107.08 0.177 1.791 1.808 
2 15 
-1781.11 0.311 1.522 1.559 
3 23 
-1672.93 0.352 1.437 1.493 
4 31 
-1569.39 0.391 1.356 1.432 
5 39 
-1556.16 0.395 1.352 1.447 
* Sample: 295 individuals (N), 2360 choices. M. Pseudo-R2=1-(LL/LL0); AIC=-2(LL-P); BIC=–LL+(P/2)ln(N). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
2.5. Welfare analysis and AES scenarios 
Marginal rates of substitution between non-monetary and monetary attributes were estimated 
by calculating the ratio of the coefficient of the former to the negative of the coefficient of the 
latter [WTANM = -(βNM / βM)]. These are also called the “implicit prices”, representing the 
WTA for a 1% or 1 unit increase in the quantity of the attribute in question if it is quantitative 
(e.g., area of EFA), or for a discrete change in the attribute (e.g., from free to restrictive 
CCMA) if it is qualitative. We apply the Delta method to determine analytically the variance 
and the standard error of WTA, which is commonly used in CE applications. The 
mathematical formulation of this method is beyond the scope of the paper, but interested 
readers may consult Bliemer and Rose (2013) for a full explanation. Additionally, to provide 
a broader picture of the required payments for different AES scenarios and to estimate the 
adoption rates in terms of farmers and area, welfare changes were calculated. Thus, individual 
welfare changes related to hypothetical policy options or scenarios (U1) that change several 
attribute levels simultaneously with respect to the status quo (U0) can be obtained by using the 
compensating surplus (CS) formula [CS
 
= -1 / βM × (U0 - U1)] described by Hanemann 
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(1984). For these estimates we have assumed linearity and separability properties in the utility 
function. 
The five hypothetical AES scenarios used for the analysis are shown in Table 3. They 
represent different AES alternatives, with different combinations of the attributes of the CE. 
The two least restrictive scenarios are M_25 and EFA_50. The former is an AES with 
CCMA-Restr and CCAR-25%, and the latter is an AES with CCAR-50% and EFA-2%. The 
two most restrictive scenarios are AES_Max and AES_MaxC, which represent AES with all 
the attributes at their highest levels (CCMA-Restr, CCAR-50%, and EFA-2%) with individual 
and collective participation, respectively. Finally, there is also an intermediate scenario, 
EFAM_25, with CCMA-Restr, CCAR-25%, and EFA-2%. In all the scenarios, MONI 
remains constant and equal to 5%, since it was not significant in the LCM. Finally, we assume 
that a farmer would participate in a certain AES scenario if the level of payment is equal or 
higher than the disutility (in absolute terms) experienced by the farmer (i.e. CS) when he/she 
participates in such AES. 
Table 3. AES scenarios considered for the analysis. 
Scenario 
CCAR 
(% of olive  
tree area) 
CCMA 
(1=CCMA-Restr) 
EFA 
(% of olive  
tree area) 
COLLE 
(1=collective 
participation) 
MONI 
(% of monitored 
farms) 
M_25 25 1 0 0 5 
EFA_50 50 0 2 0 5 
EFAM_25 25 1 2 0 5 
AES_Max 50 1 2 0 5 
AES_MaxC 50 1 2 1 5 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Classes of farmers in function of their preferences toward AES 
The results of the LCM are presented in Table 4. It can be observed that the model is highly significant 
and fits well, as shown by the value of pseudo-R2. The addition of preference heterogeneity across the 
latent classes yielded a significant improvement in LCM goodness of fit compared to a Conditional 
Logit Model (CLM) goodness of fit (pseudo-R2=0.177; LL=-2107.0). As can be observed, four 
different classes were obtained based on farmers’ preferences toward AES. All but one of the 
attributes are highly significant determinants of choice, and in every case their coefficients have the 
expected sign. MONI is the attribute that received the least attention from farmers (only significant for 
farmers included in Class C2), indicating that the level of monitoring played a minor role in their 
choices. 
The differences among the four different classes can be better appreciated by observing Table 
5, which shows WTA estimates and their confidence intervals. As can be observed in this table, there 
is clearly one class that groups potential participants (Class C1), comprising 29.7% of the surveyed 
farmers with the lowest WTA for the attributes. Beside it, there is another class (Class C2, 14.6% of 
the farmers) that groups farmers who would only be willing to participate in AES if CCMA-Restr was 
not required, while also showing moderately high WTA for COLLE. Class C3 (42.1% of the farmers) 
and especially Class C4 (13.7% of the farmers) group potential non-participants but for different 
reasons. The former would not be willing to participate in any AES that includes EFA and displays 
moderately high WTA for the rest of the attributes. The latter would not be willing to participate in 
any collective AES which includes the use of CC (COLLE and CCAR), while the WTA for CCMA 
and EFA is also moderately high. 
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Table 4. Latent Class Model. 
Attributes 
C1 C2 C3 C4 
Coef.  s.e. Coef.  s.e. Coef.  s.e. Coef.  s.e. 
CCAR -0.015 ** 0.005 -0.026 *** 0.006 -0.050 *** 0.002 -0.118 *** 0.015 
CCMA -0.163  0.126 -6.104 *** 0.472 -0.811 *** 0.058 -1.120 *** 0.296 
EFA -0.119 * 0.059 -0.059  0.041 -0.559 *** 0.032 -0.260 *** 0.049 
COLLE -0.592 *** 0.130 -0.717 *** 0.214 -1.306 *** 0.072 -5.023 *** 0.747 
MONI -0.009  0.007 -0.041 ** 0.015 0.002  0.005 -0.043  0.026 
PAYM 0.014 *** 0.001 0.006 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.000 0.006 ** 0.002 
ASCsq -0.571  0.456 -2.284 *** 0.323 -0.419 *** 0.118 4.095 *** 0.690 
Share (%) 29.7% 14.6% 42.1% 13.7% 
LL = -1569.7 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 = 0.391 
         
Number of choices: 2360       
*
, 
**
, and *** reflect significance at 5, 1, and 0.1% levels respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 5. Willingness to accept (WTA) of the attributes (€/ha)µ. 
Attribute C1 C2 C3 C4 
CCAR 1.0
**
 4.1*** 13.5*** 20.4** 
(0.3/1.7) (1.8/6.5) (10.6/16.3) (8.1/32.7) 
CCMA 11.3 978.6
***
 220.3*** 193.6* 
(-6.0/28.6) (657.3/1300.0) (169.8/270.8) (41.3/345.9) 
EFA 8.2
*
 9.4ns 151.8*** 44.9** 
(0.2/16.3) (-4.6/23.5) (120.1/183.6) (13.3/76.6) 
COLLE 41.2
***
 115.0** 354.7*** 868.0** 
(23.3/59.0) (33.9/196.1) (277.6/431.7) (306.8/1429.3) 
MONI 0.6
ns
 6.5* -0.5ns 7.4ns 
(-0.4/1.6) (1.4/11.6) (-3.1/2.1) (-3.3/18.2) 
µ
 For CCAR, EFA, and MONI, it is € per 1% of increase in each of them (e.g. 1% of EFA in olive groves area). For CCMA 
and COLLE, it is € for changing from free to restrictive CCMA and from individual to collective participation respectively. 
*
, 
**
, and *** reflect significance at 5, 1, and 0.1% levels, respectively, while ns reflects non significance. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Farmer/farm characteristics of the four classes (see Tables 6 and 7) go a long way to 
explaining their stated preferences toward AES. C1 has features typically related to high likelihood of 
AES uptake. Specifically, its farmers are younger, have a higher level of education, are more likely to 
be professionally trained, have a more in-depth knowledge of the AES implemented in the region and 
cross-compliance requisites (knowledge index)6, perceive the use of CC as economically and 
environmentally beneficial, and participate more in the former AES SM7. Furthermore, their farms are 
larger, have a lower single payment per hectare, use less conventional techniques, and harvest fewer 
ground olives (i.e. olives from the soil surface). Finally it is worth mentioning that this class 
principally comprises irrigated olive groves, which reportedly make greater use of CC (Rodríguez-
Entrena and Arriaza, 2013). Actually, C1 has a higher level of initial compliance with the levels of all 
agronomic attributes, although only 7.7% of its farmers fully comply with all of them (i.e., make use 
of CCMA-Restr, CCAR-50% and EFA-2%). All of these features are reported in the literature as 
                                                 
6
 Knowledge index is obtained using the following discrete variables: knowledge of the requisites of cross compliance 
regarding both the use of CC in plots with average slope over 10% and the commitment of conserving riparian vegetation 
(scoring 2, 1 or 0 if the farmer is aware of both requisites, only one or none of them, respectively); and knowledge of options 
of AES available to the farmer (scoring 1 if the farmer is aware of AES in Andalusia, 2 if he/she is also aware of one AES in 
olive groves, SM7 or organic olive growing, and 3 if he/she is aware of both SM7 and organic olive growing). Then, the 
index is computed summing both variables divided by 2 and 3, respectively, in order to obtain a variable (“Knowledge 
index”) ranging from 0 to 1. 
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being related to higher AES uptake (see Falconer, 2000, Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Hodge and Reader, 
2010; and Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013, among others). 
The other three classes are generally characterized by features negatively correlated to AES 
uptake, but with differences among them that explain their different WTA. As regards C2, WTA 
estimates for all attributes are higher than those obtained for C1 but lower than those obtained for the 
other two classes, with the exception of CCMA. There are several characteristics that confirm this 
intermediate position with regard to WTA estimates. It is the class with the youngest farmers. 
Furthermore, their farms are above average with regard to olive groves and total area, they present 
lower single payment per hectare, make lower use of conventional techniques, there is a lower share of 
non-trained farmers, and they have the highest percentage of EFA (which explains the low WTA for 
EFA). Lastly, it is worth noting the majority of C2-farmers have rain-fed olive groves (64.3%), in 
which CC management usually consists of tilling and, to a lesser extent, applying herbicides. So, they 
do not normally refuse to use CC but rather refuse to manage it without using tillage, in the belief that 
tillage helps reduce soil water evaporation during summertime. Thus, it is not surprising that C2-
farmers show the highest WTA for implementing CCMA-Restr. 
With regard to C3, preferences of this non-participant class are mainly characterized by high 
WTA for all attributes, especially EFA. Hence, WTA estimates are higher than those reported for not 
only C1 but also C2, except for CCMA in the case of the latter. Accordingly, farm/farmer 
characteristics reflect this non-participant condition, with some characteristics shared with the other 
non-participant class (C4). C3 is the class with the smallest average olive tree and total area, highest 
single payment per hectare, smallest share of AES participating farmers, highest share of non-trained 
farmers, and it ranks second in terms of age and use of conventional farming techniques. With respect 
to any of these characteristics, however, C3 presents statistically significant differences from C4. In 
any case, there are other features of C3 that differentiate it from C4, and explain their different 
preferences toward AES. For example, C3-farmers have a more positive perception of the use of CC, 
and have a moderately high knowledge index. Moreover, it is the class with the highest share of 
irrigated olive groves, which is also related to the higher adoption of CC. These differences seem to be 
behind the non-extreme WTA estimates regarding CCAR and CCMA. Regarding the former, despite 
the characteristics positively correlated to CC use, it is worth noting that WTA is still high (€13.5 per 
1% of CCAR). The main reason behind such a high WTA is that C3-farmers find that high levels of 
CCAR hinder the harvesting of ground olives. Accordingly, C3 is the class with both the lowest 
percentage of farmers with CCAR equal to or higher than 50% (CCAR-50%=5.1%) and the highest 
percentage of olives harvested from the ground. As regards EFA, C3 has the highest WTA, which is to 
be expected given it is also the class with lowest percentage of EFA (0.68%), consistent with the fact 
that they are mostly located in Jaen (where an olive monoculture exists). 
C4 has the highest WTA regarding COLLE and CCAR, as well as moderately high WTA for 
CCMA and EFA. Thus, it represents a genuine class of non-participants. This fact can be explained by 
the extreme figures related with farmer characteristics: highest age and lowest levels of education, 
knowledge index and appreciation of CC. Moreover, as a non-participant class, it has low olive tree 
and total area, high single payment per hectare, low level of farming training, and high use of 
conventional techniques (as does C3). 
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Table 6. Description of the classes. Average values of numerical variables*. 
Type Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 Total Kruskal-Wallis H p-value 
Farm 
Olive tree area (ha) 35.8 b 28.3 ab 19.5 a 22.4 a 26.1 8.46 0.037 
Total area (ha) 43.6 b 33.1 ab 21.1 a 23.7 a 30.0 9.65 0.022 
Ground harvested / total olive harvested (%) 9.3 a 15.6 ab 22.3 b 13.9 a 16.1 18.29 0.000 
CC / olive tree area (%) 32.4 b 22.2 a 22.0 a 21.3 a 25.1 10.69 0.014 
EFA / olive tree area (%) 1.71 b 1.79 b 0.68 a 1.50 ab 1.28 11.54 0.009 
Single payment (€/ha) 513.6 a 536.1 ab 640.1 b 634.5 ab 585.4 10.93 0.012 
Farmer 
Age (years) 49.3 ab 46.5 a 50.8 bc 54.5 c 50.3 11.05 0.011 
Knowledge indexµ (adim., 0 to 1) 0.49 b 0.41 ab 0.42 ab 0.33 a 0.424 10.68 0.014 
Perception of CC as environmentally beneficial (adim., 1-5) 4.40 b 4.24 ab 4.43 b 3.84 a 4.30 8.63 0.035 
Perception of CC as economically beneficial (adim., 1-5) 3.78 c 2.88 ab 3.78 bc 2.36 a 3.43 37.59 0.000 
*
 Mann-Whitney U was used in pairwise comparisons between classes to show ranking (see superscript letters), at a 5% significance level. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 7. Description of the classes. Categorical variables (in %)*. 
Type Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 
Total Chi-square 
% Obs. χ2 p-value 
Farm 
Cordoba 42.9 47.6 38.1 45.5  42.0 124 1.51 0.680 
Jaen 29.7a 28.6ab 51.7b 31.8 ab 38.6 114 14.23 0.003 
Malaga 27.5b 23.8ab 10.2a 22.7 ab 19.3 57 11.09 0.011 
Mountain olive groves 26.4 21.4 25.4 27.3  25.4 75 0.48 0.924 
Rain-fed olive groves 33.0a 64.3b 33.1a 45.5 ab 39.3 104 15.15 0.002 
Irrigated olive groves 40.7b 14.3a 41.5b 27.3 ab 35.3 116 12.52 0.006 
Use of conventional techniques 56.0 59.5 71.2 72.7  65.1 192 6.91 0.075 
Participation in current AES 26.4b 11.9ab 11.9a 13.6 ab 16.6 49 9.13 0.028 
Farmer 
Education level-at least high school 54.0b 33.3ab 36.8ab 27.3 a 40.0 116 11.39 0.010 
Not trained 42.0a 47.6ab 65.8b 60.5 ab 55.1 158 12.78 0.005 
*
 Z-test was used to show ranking (see superscript letters), at a 5% significance level.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
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3.2. AES Scenarios 
Table 8 shows the results of estimates regarding compensating surpluses for each scenario and 
each class. Logically, the different preferences among classes hold, with C1 being the class with the 
lowest compensating surpluses (less than €100/ha) in any of the scenarios, and C4 the class with the 
highest compensating surpluses on average. C2, on the other hand, shows very high compensating 
surpluses for scenarios that include CCMA-Restr (all the scenarios considered except EFA_50), and 
C3 also has high compensating surpluses, especially when more EFA and CC area are required. 
Assuming estimates of compensating surpluses as the money required to make farmers participate in 
AES, it is likely that C1-farmers would participate in any of the five scenarios considered in return for 
relatively low payments; C4-farmers would require an unaffordable high level of payments (above 
€430/ha) to make them participate in any of the scenarios; while C2-farmers would likely participate 
in a scenario without CCMA-Restr (e.g., EFA_50, at a payment of €135.7/ha), but not in the other four 
scenarios; and C3s would only participate in a scenario without EFA and with low CC area (e.g., 
M_25) for a moderately high payment (€245.9/ha). 
Table 8. Mean compensating surpluses for AES scenarios in the 4 classes, in €/ha (standard 
errors in brackets). 
Scenario C1 C2 C3 C4 
M_25 13.8 * (5.4) 976.2*** (163.0) 245.9*** (25.7) 437.2** (139.8) 
EFA_50 33.0 *** (9.5) 135.7*** (39.7) 615.2*** (63.2) 716.6** (222.5) 
EFAM_25 23.6 ** (7.5) 988.8*** (167.1) 478.2*** (48.2) 499.2** (160.6) 
AES_Max 39.1 *** (10.7) 1065.4*** (180.8) 751.7*** (75.9) 879.2** (274.6) 
AES_MaxC 80.3 *** (14.2) 1180.4*** (205.8) 1106.4*** (112.0) 1747.2** (542.7) 
*
, 
**
, and *** reflect significance at 5, 1, and 0.1% levels respectively. 
 Source: Own elaboration. 
Figure 1 shows the likelihood of participation in AES both in terms of percentage of farmers 
and area for the different scenarios considered and different payments. Clearly, the participation rate 
(in terms of both farmers and area) changes depending on the scenario considered. For example, at the 
€100/ha-level of payment 18% and 45% of the farmers would be willing to participate in AES_MaxC 
and M_25, respectively, which corresponds to the minimum and maximum rate obtained for the five 
scenarios. In terms of area, for the same €100/ha-level of payment the participation rate is higher than 
in terms of farmers, ranging from 30 to 60% of the area depending on the scenario. This difference 
between both ranges of percentage is due to C1-farmers, as they are those who first participate in AES 
at lower payments and own larger farms. 
Figure 1 provides interesting information for policy-makers, as it shows the convexity of 
participation rate curves, allowing the identification of the points of the curve of each scenario where 
further increases in the payment yield a lower response in terms of participation rates. In the case of 
farmers’ participation rate in the AES_MaxC scenario, that point is reached at approximately €125/ha 
(which corresponds to a 27% participation rate), which indicates that there would be a smaller 
response in terms of farmer participation in this AES scenario once this payment threshold is 
exceeded. Logically, this threshold is different depending on the scenario considered, being €100/ha 
for EFA_50, EFAM_25 and AES_Max (40, 36 and 32% participation rate, respectively); and €50/ha 
for M_25 (41% participation rate). In terms of area, the picture changes slightly, with the most cost-
efficient payments remaining the same as for farmers (€125/ha and 46% participation rate for 
AES_MaxC; €100/ha and 52% and 60% for AES_Max and EFA_50; and €50/ha and 60% for M_25) 
with the exception of one scenario (€75/ha for EFAM_25 and 52% participation rate). 
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Figure 1. Participation in different scenarios of AES and payments. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
4. Discussion and policy implications 
There is a high heterogeneity among olive growers’ regarding their preferences toward AES under 
current conditions and policy makers must take this into account when designing such schemes. A 
potential participant class (C1) is clearly identified, comprising 30% of farmers and 41% of area, 
irrespective of the combination of attributes of the scheme. In order to encourage more farmers to be 
participants, careful attention would have to be paid to the combination of attributes and the monetary 
incentive established. For instance, to encourage an additional 15% of farmers (class C2) to participate 
in AES, a moderately higher monetary incentive would be required and the use of tillage and 
herbicides in managing CC should not be restricted. Also, for most C3-farmers (representing 42% of 
the total), higher monetary incentives would be required but with lower levels of stringency in each 
attribute. Nevertheless, there is a group of farmers (C4) that would not participate in AES whatever the 
combination of attributes. Apart from payments and requisites, an additional way to encourage 
farmers’ AES uptake could be to improve relevant features such as farmers’ training and information 
about AES and its attributes. 
In this section the most relevant points arising from the results are outlined, first those related 
to each of the attributes separately, and second those linked to the proposed AES scenarios. 
4.1. Design and agronomic attributes in AES 
As stated previously, the use of CC is the most relevant agricultural practice in terms of enhancing the 
production of public goods in olive growing. This is why the Regional government has widely 
encouraged its use. Not surprisingly, then, our survey reveals that this practice is quite widely used 
nowadays (three quarters of the sampled farmers use CC, being 25% the average area covered). With 
regard to the CC area attribute, we find that 44% of the farmers (C1 and C2) would be willing to use 
CC at a 50%-level of olive tree area for low-to-medium monetary incentives (€1.0/ha and €4.1/ha per 
1% of increase of CCAR, respectively) while the rest (C3 and C4) would not. Yet, reasons behind high 
WTA differ between the latter two classes. C4-farmers are not willing to use CC because they do not 
consider it useful. For them, CC are weeds and, as these farmers are the oldest and least educated, it is 
very difficult to convince them not to remove CC. The case of C3 is more complex. C3-farmers would 
not be willing to reach a 50% level of CCAR since it would make it more difficult to harvest ground 
olives, which is important for these farmers. If we assumed that C3-farmers believe that reaching 
CCAR-50% totally precludes the harvesting of ground olives, net income forgone could be estimated 
at €183-350/ha (using estimates by Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011), while the WTA of C3-farmers 
to reach that level would be €378/ha on average. Thus, it seems that C3-farmers’ WTA is in line with 
their perceived net income forgone. Regarding this point, it is worth commenting that the olive oil 
industry usually pays less for ground olives because of their characteristic dirtiness and worse 
organoleptic properties. In this sense, there is a market incentive for early harvesting directly from the 
tree. Hence, from a policy perspective it may be worth training farmers to avoid ground olives 
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harvesting, enabling olive growers to benefit from this quality premium. If this were the case, net 
income forgone associated with CC (from harvesting of ground olives) would be much lower or even 
non-existent, reducing WTA for implementing this practice. 
Regarding CC management, most of the farmers would not be willing to manage CC without 
tilling and/or with restrictions as to the number of herbicide treatments (3 classes, totaling 70.3% of 
the farmers, show average WTA higher than €190/ha). This is in line with the evidence found in the 
literature that highlights strong farmer preferences toward flexibility concerning farming requisites 
included in AES (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2011). For the case of olive growing 
two main reasons are behind these results, namely the existence of resistant species and farmers’ 
beliefs regarding soil water conservation. Regarding the former, many olive growers are worried about 
the presence of resistant species within CC, and thus they have a negative perception of the reduction 
of permitted options to manage CC. Regarding the latter, many producers, especially those with 
traditional plain olive groves (non-steep slope-land and rain-fed conditions), consider tillage a 
convenient way to reduce soil water evaporation during summertime. As a result, CCMA-Restr 
appears very stringent to most of the olive growers. If policy-makers wanted a participation rate above 
30% they would be justified in not including such a requisite. Alternatively, it would be worth 
considering it as a requisite only under certain circumstances (e.g., in environmentally-sensitive areas). 
With regard to the ecological focus areas, we find that there are two classes of farmers (C1 
and C2, totaling 44% of the sampled farmers) that would be willing to implement them in exchange 
for low payments (€8.2/ha and €9.4/ha per additional 1% of the farmland devoted to EFA, 
respectively), another class for a low-medium payment (C4 with €44.9/ha per additional 1% devoted 
to EFA) and another for a high payment (C3 with €151.8/ha per additional 1% devoted to EFA). 
Similar estimates were produced by Schulz et al. (2014), who also distinguished between farmers 
willing and not willing to implement EFA in their arable land (with average WTA of €8.9/ha and 
€51.4/ha per additional 1% devoted to EFA, respectively). With regard to C1 and C2-farmers, their 
WTA are similar to their net income forgone (€8.2-15.7/ha, also using estimates by Gómez-Limón and 
Arriaza, 2011). However, low willingness to participate in AES shown by C3 and C4-farmers results 
in much higher WTA, substantially above their net income forgone.  
If a share of EFA beyond 2-3% was required the WTA would presumably be higher regardless 
of the class considered, bearing in mind the general farmers’ rejection of the option of complying with 
EFA by maintaining some olive trees out of production. Such rejection is reflected in two figures 
obtained from the survey: first, the 97% of sampled olive growers have not any olive tree out of 
production in their farm; second, only 30% of the sampled olive growers that would be willing to 
participate in AES would also be willing to use olive trees out of production to comply with the 
minimum share of EFA. This suggests that those olive growers willing to comply with a minimum of 
EFA would do it mostly by using buffer strips, vegetation boundaries and islets, being all of these 
elements limited by the spatial restrictions revealed in olive groves. Therefore, higher levels of EFA 
(e.g., 5-7%), apart from being very difficult to achieve in the case of Andalusian olive groves, would 
require very high monetary incentives. This result calls for careful consideration of the specific initial 
circumstances of the farms, taking into account that some of them could easily comply with EFA 
requirements -at least for low levels-, while others could barely comply even at the lowest levels. In 
the case of the latter, it would be necessary to make use of the EFA equivalents allowed in the future 
CAP if EFA were also enforced in permanent crops. 
With regard to collective participation, the four classes of farmers reflect different levels of 
disutility, from low (C1, €41.2/ha) to very high (C4, €868.0/ha) WTA. The qualitative information 
gathered during the survey suggests that the different WTA estimates are likely due to the different 
farmers’ perception of transaction costs related to collective participation in AES (in line with the 
evidences found in Rocamora-Montiel et al., 2014) and the different disutility anticipated or expected 
by farmers related to losing a bit -more- of their freedom of farm management due to such a 
participation. To be precise in regard to the latter, farmers value differently the fact of being controlled 
not only by the Administration, as in every AES, but also by farmer-members of the group who, more 
importantly, are also neighbors of the same village. 
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Given the wide range of WTA for collective participation in AES, setting the monetary 
incentive is crucial to promote collective participation in AES. The latest CAP regulations include an 
up-to-30% bonus to promote such participation. According to the WTA approach, none of the classes 
would participate in return for this bonus at the cost-efficient payments highlighted for each scenario. 
For instance, AES_Max presents a cost-efficient payment of €100€/ha; with a bonus of €30/ha none of 
the classes would be willing to participate in AES_Max collectively. If the reference was included in 
the AES currently applied (SM7), 30% would represent €61.2-85.8/ha, which would imply that only 
C1-farmers would participate collectively. Thus, the collective bonus has to be large enough to 
promote collective participation, although not larger than the gains expected from it. As regards the 
latter, although expected gains from the reduction of public transaction costs could easily be estimated, 
those derived from the higher environmental performance are far more difficult to quantify, depending 
not only on the requisites/practices included in the AES, but also the proximity and configuration of 
enrolled farmland (Sutherland et al., 2012). Thus, an up-to-30% bonus can be considered too rough an 
estimation to reflect society’s net gains from collective participation. Therefore, it is clear that further 
research is needed to cover knowledge gaps about costs and -in particular- gains of collective 
participation. 
With respect to the level of monitoring, the main outcome here is that farmers are barely 
aware of it when it comes to choosing whether to participate in AES or not, at least in the presence of 
other attributes that they perceive as more important. This appears to be counterintuitive and in 
opposition to the literature on AES uptake. Actually, Broch and Vedel (2012) estimated farmers’ 
WTA of €38/ha per 1% absolute increase in the level of monitoring. Our results indicate different 
farmer behavior, thus calling for further research to establish to what extent significant disutility to 
higher levels of monitoring in AES can generally be expected. This further research could be focused 
on the reasons behind this different behavior. In particular, the informal information collected during 
the survey suggests that two different reasons could be behind such low WTA, namely the willingness 
to comply with the requisites (expecting “fair” monitoring) and the adoption of strategic behavior (i.e., 
not willing to comply, assuming that they will not be fully monitored). Moreover, it could also be 
explored whether the enforcement of low sanctions in previous AES in olive growing would be 
another explanation for such a low WTA. 
The classes heterogeneity points out to some general factors influencing AES uptake which 
are worth discussing. Among factors related to farm characteristics, the results suggest a positive 
relationship of farm area and irrigated olive groves with respect to AES uptake. The fact that larger 
farms are usually more willing to participate in AES has been widely reported in previous works, not 
only for arable cropping systems (Falconer, 2000; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Hodge and Reader, 2010, 
among others) but also for permanent cropping systems such as olive groves (Franco, 2011). As these 
authors highlight, higher economies of scale and comparatively lower transaction costs are the main 
reasons behind their greater willingness to participate in AES. In the case of irrigated farms, there 
appear to be more than one reason behind such a relationship. On the one hand, irrigated olive groves 
usually require a more qualified management than rainfed ones, thus their farmers are frequently more 
prone to adopt new technology and have higher training level (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011). In 
this regard, literature reports professional training as a positive factor of adoption of innovations by 
olive growers (Franco and Calatrava-Leyva, 2010; Rodríguez-Entrena and Arriaza, 2013; Rodríguez-
Entrena et al., 2014a). In addition, for the case study there is a more specific reason related to the use 
of CC as a requisite of AES, namely: as a result of the lower competition for water between irrigated 
olive trees and CC, farmers are less reluctant to adopt CC (Franco and Calatrava-Leyva, 2010) and, 
thus, to participate in an AES that includes this practice as a requisite.  
In considering farmers’ characteristics, age, knowledge and perception, as well as the 
abovementioned farmer’s training, appear to be related to AES uptake. The fact that younger farmers 
are more willing to adopt soil conservation practices (Calatrava-Leyva et al., 2007) and to participate 
in AES, for both, arable cropping systems (Ruto and Garrod, 2009) and permanent ones (Franco, 
2011), has been largely indicated in the specialized literature. With regard to farmer’s knowledge, as 
Franco and Calatrava-Leyva (2010) point out, olive growers who update their technical knowledge are 
more willing to adopt soil conservation practices. Also, farmer’s perception has revealed to be key for 
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adopting soil conservation practices and AES. In our research, it appears that the greater the 
perception of CC as environmentally and economically beneficial, the higher the AES uptake is. The 
positive farmers’ attitude toward the environmental benefits of using certain practices has been 
previously remarked as a factor of AES uptake (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Furthermore, Franco and 
Calatrava-Leyva (2010) found that those olive growers who more significantly perceived soil erosion 
as an important problem in their farms were more willing to adopt soil conservation practices. The 
positive relationship between the perception of CC as economically beneficial and the adoption of 
environmental-friendly practices is also in line with results obtained by Rodríguez-Entrena et al. 
(2014a), who highlighted the influence of economic parameters of olive groves (such as, output and 
profitability) on the adoption of soil conservation practices. 
4.2. AES scenarios in olive growing 
In the context of the CAP, in olive growing there are only two relevant levels of compensation 
regarding the production of environmental public goods, one is defined by cross-compliance and the 
other by AES (the intermediate level fixed by the green payment does not apply for permanent crops). 
In this sense, the scenarios proposed in the previous section include environmental requirements 
beyond the former, from moderate to large increase in the environmental performance (represented by 
M_25 and AES_Max, respectively). They also represent a different policy scope, from a wide targeted 
area with moderate increase in environmental performance to a limited targeted area with large 
increase in such performance. For instance, if we assume that the budget for AES in olive growing is 
to remain the same as for the Andalusian Rural Development Program 2007-2013 (€12.25m/year), and 
use levels of payment identified as the most cost-efficient, it can be estimated that 245,000 ha (16.3% 
of the olive grove area of Andalusia) would be enrolled in M_25 for a payment of €50/ha. In contrast, 
for the same budget, 122,500 ha (8.2%) would be enrolled in AES_Max for a payment of €100/ha. 
This figure would be even lower if collective participation was required (98,000 ha ‒6.5%– for 
AES_MaxC with a payment of €125/ha). 
Whatever the policy approach, policy makers must ensure that gains outweigh the costs of 
AES implementation from a public point of view. For instance, using estimates obtained from 
Rodríguez-Entrena et al. (2012), Andalusian society’s compensating surplus for implementing M_25 
would be €103.7/ha, and €204.8/ha for AES_Max7. Accordingly, for both AES scenarios, there would 
be a net benefit from their implementation if payments were established below those figures (assuming 
zero transaction costs). Then, at the cost-effective payments of €50/ha and €100/ha identified for 
M_25 and AES_Max, it can be concluded that society would benefit from the implementation of these 
two AES scenarios. However, the choice between these two scenarios is not straightforward as total 
net benefits would be very similar (€13.2million and €12.8million respectively, obtained by 
multiplying net gains by area enrolled). In any case, for a more robust conclusion in this regard, 
further research would be needed in order to refine benefit estimates (more targeted valuation 
assessment) and the inclusion of actual transaction costs. If these results were confirmed, an 
interesting option would be to explore the implementation of two levels of AES simultaneously, 
similar to the Entry and Higher Level of Stewardship scheme in the UK (Hodge and Reader, 2010). 
 
5. Conclusions 
AES are useful policy instruments for enhancing the orientation of CAP to the production of 
environmental public goods (Hodge, 2013). In spite of the extensive literature generated about such 
schemes, some important issues remain understudied. Here we have analyzed several issues that have 
received little or no attention, namely the implementation of AES in permanent crops, EFA and 
collective participation. 
                                                 
7
 These figures are obtained using the following estimates: €29.7/t CO2 sequestered; €4.2/t of soil loss prevented; and 
€0.6/bird·ha (Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2012). Additionally, to include benefits from higher visual quality of landscape when 
EFA and CC were presented, ratios between such functions and the other environmental functions were used according to 
estimates from Arriaza and Gómez-Limón (2011). 
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Some valuable conclusions of special interest for agri-environmental policy-making can be 
drawn from the results. First, a high degree of heterogeneity was found as regards olive growers’ 
preferences toward AES. In particular, four different classes of olive growers have been distinguished 
based on their preferences. There are clearly two extreme classes: one comprising potential 
participants (i.e., members are willing to participate even with stringent requirements) and another 
comprising non-participants. There are two other intermediate classes that comprise farmers willing to 
participate but with different combinations of requirements and different WTA. 
Second, such heterogeneity is also reflected separately in most of the attributes studied. Hence, 
we find different intensity of preferences toward each attribute when the comparison is made within 
classes. For instance, there is clearly one class that rejects EFA, another that rejects restrictive 
management of CC, and two classes that reject both collective participation and using CC, with 
intermediate classes for all the attributes. The only exception is the level of monitoring, which 
received little attention from most of the farmers. This specific result about monitoring calls for further 
research given the fact that other works report the opposite (i.e., monitoring is a strong determinant of 
farmers’ preferences toward AES). Moreover, farmer/farm characteristics play a major role as 
determinants of farmers’ preferences toward AES, suggesting that it may be worth implementing some 
complementary measures in order to increase participation rates in AES (e.g., specific training 
programs for farmers). 
Third, specific policy implications can also be derived regarding each attribute. With respect 
to the agronomic attributes (concerning CC and EFA), training, status quo, and flexibility of the 
requirements are important factors in farmers’ choice as to whether to participate in AES that include 
such attributes. As regards EFA, almost half of the farmers would be willing to accept it for a low 
monetary incentive (€8-9/ha per additional 1% of the farmland devoted to EFA) while the rest would 
do it for a moderate to high monetary incentive (€41-151/ha per additional 1% of EFA). However, for 
higher shares of EFA (e.g., 5-7%) these estimates would presumably be higher due to the intrinsic 
spatial restrictions of olive groves and farmers’ rejection to comply with EFA by maintaining some 
olive trees out of production. With regard to collective participation, the up-to-30% EU-wide bonus set 
in the EU Regulation should be carefully revised, as the monetary incentive is critical for promoting 
such participation. For instance, we have found that in general it would be insufficient for most of the 
olive growers to make them participate collectively.  
Finally, as olive growing has only two CAP levels regarding the production of environmental 
public goods (cross-compliance and AES), it would be interesting in terms of AES implementation to 
design two different schemes representing moderate and large increases compared to the provision at 
the cross-compliance level. This approach would also allow olive growers to choose the alternative 
that most suits them, thus facilitating their participation in AES. However, whatever the chosen 
alternative, supply and demand analysis must be run together in order to ensure that positive social 
welfare gains associated with the implementation of this alternative are to be achieved.  
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Appendix A. Example of choice set. 
Figure A. Example of a choice set. 
 
